Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
The Ruling
Bitcoin had lost two-thirds of its value since mid-December 2017, plunging from a peak of nearly $20,000 to around $6,750 by the first week of July 2018. While multiple factors contributed to the dramatic decline — regulatory crackdowns, exchange hacks, and waning retail enthusiasm — a growing chorus of economists pointed to a single, surprisingly precise catalyst: the introduction of Bitcoin futures trading in the United States.
The argument, articulated most prominently by Japanese economist Yukio Noguchi in a widely circulated article published in Diamond Weekly in late June 2018, was striking in its simplicity. Noguchi observed that the Cboe Futures Exchange launched Bitcoin futures trading on December 10, 2017, and that Bitcoin’s price peaked just five days later, on December 15. The timing, Noguchi argued, was not coincidental.
“Because it’s now possible to trade on Bitcoin futures, you’ll never see a rapid surge again,” Noguchi wrote. The implication was that the very financial instrument designed to legitimize Bitcoin in the eyes of institutional investors had instead given skeptics the tool they needed to profit from its decline — and in doing so, had permanently altered the cryptocurrency’s price dynamics.
International Precedents
Noguchi’s analysis was not an isolated opinion. Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco had published a paper in May 2018 titled “How Futures Trading Changed Bitcoin Prices” that reached strikingly similar conclusions. The Fed researchers argued that the introduction of futures markets for an asset class historically driven by optimistic speculation created a mechanism for pessimists to express their views — and profit from them.
“The rapid run-up and subsequent fall in the price after the introduction of futures does not appear to be a coincidence,” the paper stated. “Rather, it is consistent with trading behavior that typically accompanies the introduction of futures markets for an asset.”
The historical parallels were sobering. The Fed economists pointed to the housing bubble of the late 2000s, which was initially fueled by optimistic speculation through securitized mortgage instruments. The subsequent bust, they noted, was accelerated when financial instruments were created that allowed pessimistic investors to bet against the housing market — most notably through credit default swaps and short positions on mortgage-backed securities.
A similar pattern played out in Japan in the early 1990s. The Tokyo stock market bubble, which had inflated to extraordinary valuations during the late 1980s, began its long deflation shortly after the introduction of stock-index futures. These instruments allowed skeptics to short the market efficiently, accelerating the correction that would eventually wipe out decades of gains.
Enforcement Reality
The practical mechanics of how futures trading suppressed Bitcoin prices were relatively straightforward. Before December 2017, the only way to bet against Bitcoin was to sell holdings or to engage in complex and risky margin trading on unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges. The vast majority of market participants were bullish, and the limited avenues for shorting meant that pessimistic voices had little ability to influence price discovery.
The launch of Cboe Bitcoin futures on December 10, followed by CME Group’s Bitcoin futures on December 17, changed this calculus entirely. Suddenly, institutional investors, hedge funds, and proprietary trading firms could take short positions on Bitcoin through regulated, well-capitalized exchanges. The cost of betting against Bitcoin plummeted, and the volume of bearish bets surged.
The timing aligned almost perfectly with Bitcoin’s reversal. After touching approximately $19,783 on December 17 — the same day CME futures launched — the cryptocurrency entered a sustained downtrend that would see it lose more than 65% of its value over the next six months. By early July 2018, Bitcoin was trading around $6,750, with Ethereum at $482, XRP at $0.49, and EOS at $9.10. The total cryptocurrency market capitalization had shrunk from over $800 billion at its peak to approximately $250 billion.
The broader market carnage extended beyond the top cryptocurrencies. Many smaller tokens that had launched during the ICO boom of 2017 had become effectively worthless or were approaching zero. Bloomberg drew parallels between the cryptocurrency collapse and the dot-com bust of the early 2000s, noting that the percentage of tokens losing 90% or more of their value was approaching levels seen during that historic deflation.
Market Shockwaves
The skeptics had been vocal throughout Bitcoin’s meteoric rise. Warren Buffett, the legendary investor and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, famously dismissed Bitcoin as “rat poison squared” at his annual shareholder meeting in May 2018. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, who had previously called Bitcoin a “fraud,” softened his rhetoric slightly but still advised investors to “just beware.” Economist Nouriel Roubini, who had predicted the 2008 financial crisis, labeled Bitcoin “the biggest bubble in human history.”
Before futures trading, these bears could only talk. After December 2017, they could act — and their actions had real market impact. The introduction of a regulated short-selling mechanism validated the bears’ thesis in a way that mere words never could. Each short position placed on Cboe or CME sent a signal to the broader market: sophisticated, well-capitalized investors were willing to put real money behind the belief that Bitcoin was overvalued.
This dynamic created a self-reinforcing cycle. As Bitcoin’s price declined, more institutional participants were drawn to the short side, generating additional selling pressure that drove prices lower still. The optimistic retail investors who had driven the rally to $20,000 found themselves outgunned by professional traders with access to sophisticated hedging and risk management tools.
Closing Thoughts
The irony of the futures market thesis was that it highlighted a fundamental tension at the heart of cryptocurrency’s evolution. The introduction of Bitcoin futures was widely celebrated by the crypto community as a milestone — proof that Bitcoin had arrived as a legitimate asset class worthy of institutional attention. Cboe and CME’s launches were greeted with enthusiasm and predictions of further price appreciation, as many assumed institutional participation would bring new demand and higher prices.
Instead, the opposite occurred. The very legitimacy that futures markets conferred on Bitcoin also brought with it the full arsenal of traditional finance’s bearish strategies. The optimists who had driven the rally suddenly found themselves sharing the market with professional short-sellers who had decades of experience profiting from overvalued assets.
Whether Noguchi’s prediction that Bitcoin would “never see a rapid surge again” would prove accurate remained an open question. Bitcoin had demonstrated remarkable resilience, still trading at more than ten times its value from just two years prior. The cryptocurrency market had also shown signs of recovery in early July, with Bitcoin gaining 13% from its late-June lows and many altcoins posting similar gains.
But the economists’ analysis raised uncomfortable questions about the nature of price discovery in cryptocurrency markets. If futures trading truly had punctured the speculative bubble, then any future rally would need to be driven by fundamentals — adoption, utility, and real-world use cases — rather than purely by optimistic speculation. That represented a profound shift in how cryptocurrency markets would operate, and one that many participants were only beginning to understand in the summer of 2018.
noguchi was right and history proved it. every time wall street gets a shorting instrument, retail gets demolished
noguchi saying youll never see a rapid surge again aged pretty poorly given what happened in 2020-2021 lol
Noguchi saying youll never see a rapid surge again was embarrassingly wrong. 2020 and 2021 proved futures cut both ways. they cap manias but also fuel leverage
futures cut both ways is exactly right. 2018 they amplified the crash. 2020-2021 they amplified the rally. noguchi was wrong about direction but right about mechanism
retail got demolished in 2018 but came back harder in 2020. wall street shorting instruments work both ways
btc peaked 5 days after cboe futures launched. 5 days. if thats not correlation i dont know what is
CME launched futures on Dec 18, Cboe on Dec 10. BTC peaked Dec 15 right between them. the timing is impossible to ignore
CME on the 18th Cboe on the 10th BTC peaked the 15th right in between. two derivatives venues opening short pressure within a week was not coincidence
5 days is tight but you could also argue btc was already overextended at $20k and the futures just gave it a reason to correct
i was there in december 2017. cboe launched futures and the top was 5 days later. noguchi got the timing right even if his prediction about no more surges was wrong
retail got wrecked but futures also let institutions hedge properly. its not purely negative, just a double edged sword