Two memecoin projects on the Base network suffered devastating smart contract exploits on May 26 and 27, 2024, wiping out millions of dollars in market capitalization and exposing critical vulnerabilities in low-cap token smart contracts. The attacks on NORMIE and Based Doge (BOGE) followed an identical exploit pattern, raising urgent questions about the security standards governing memecoin launches.
The Exploit Mechanics
Both attacks exploited a critical flaw in the get_premarket_user function within the tokens’ smart contracts. This function was designed to grant special minting privileges to premarket participants and the deployer wallet. However, the implementation contained a logical vulnerability: any user who matched the deployer wallet’s token balance could be recognized as a “privileged user” with full minting authority.
The attacker systematically traded tokens until their wallet balance precisely matched that of the deployer wallet. Once parity was achieved, the smart contract’s authorization check granted the attacker the same elevated privileges as the contract owner. With minting rights secured, the attacker generated over 170,000 NORMIE tokens out of thin air and immediately dumped them on the open market, triggering a catastrophic price collapse.
In the case of BOGE, the attacker called an unverified function on a smart contract located at an address ending in 1a42, initiating over 120 individual transactions on the Base network. Each transaction siphoned hundreds of thousands of BOGE tokens, accumulating approximately 91.4 million tokens before the attacker converted them to roughly 4.47 ETH, worth approximately $16,926 at the time of the attack.
Affected Systems
The NORMIE token exploit on May 26 resulted in losses exceeding $800,000, with the token’s market capitalization plunging by $41.7 million within three hours. The token’s value collapsed by 99%, leaving holders with near-worthless positions. On May 27, the BOGE token suffered the same fate, with 91.4 million tokens drained and the price plummeting from $0.002983 to $0.000072 — a loss of more than $2.8 million in market capitalization.
With Bitcoin trading at $69,394 and Ethereum at $3,892 at the time, the broader crypto market was focused on the landmark Ethereum ETF approvals. The memecoin exploits unfolded largely under the radar, amplified by reduced scrutiny during a period of major market-wide news coverage.
The Mitigation Strategy
Following the BOGE exploit, the development team announced plans to take a snapshot of current token balances and relaunch the project with compensation for affected holders. The NORMIE attacker reportedly offered to return 90% of the stolen tokens, requesting 10% as a bug bounty with no legal consequences. Both responses highlight the ad hoc nature of incident response in the memecoin space, where formal security procedures are often absent.
Web3 insurance provider Neptune Mutual published an analysis identifying the root cause as the faulty access control mechanism in the get_premarket_user function. The exploit underscores the importance of comprehensive smart contract audits, particularly for functions that grant elevated privileges based on on-chain state conditions.
Lessons Learned
These exploits demonstrate several critical security principles that every token project must internalize. First, access control functions should never rely solely on balance comparisons, as these conditions can be artificially satisfied by any sufficiently motivated attacker. Second, smart contract code should be fully verified on block explorers to enable community auditing. The BOGE attacker exploited an unverified contract, preventing the community from identifying the vulnerability before it was too late.
Third, the rapid replication of the exploit across two separate projects within 24 hours illustrates how attackers share and reuse successful exploit patterns. Once a vulnerability is discovered in one contract, all contracts with similar code structures become immediate targets. Projects deploying forked or shared codebases face heightened risk during the window between initial exploitation and patch deployment.
User Action Required
Investors holding memecoin positions should verify that the underlying smart contracts have undergone professional audits from recognized security firms. Unverified contracts and projects without published audit reports represent elevated risk. Users should also monitor blockchain activity through tools like Etherscan or BaseScan, watching for unusual transaction patterns such as rapid large-scale token movements from unverified contract functions. In the event of an exploit, immediate token withdrawal to a secure wallet and cessation of trading on affected pools can help minimize losses.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Always conduct your own research before engaging with any cryptocurrency project.
the exploit was absurdly simple. match the deployer wallet balance and you get minting privileges. thats not a bug, thats practically an invitation
99% crashes on both NORMIE and BOGE within 24 hours and the exploit was identical. Base needs better tooling for memecoin audits or this will keep happening
balance comparison as auth is not a bug its a design failure. whoever wrote that get_premarket_user function had zero understanding of access control
dev_null_ design failure is the right framing. whoever wrote get_premarket_user probably copy pasted from a tutorial and nobody reviewed it
matching the deployer wallet balance to get minting rights is such a simple exploit it hurts. auditors literally test for this
the fact that BOTH tokens had the same vulnerability tells me they copy-pasted the same contract template. zero original code review
exactly. if you deploy from a fork at least check what get_premarket_user does line by line
the attacker minted over 17 trillion tokens after getting those privileges. the fact that a balance comparison was the only auth check is wild negligence
17 trillion minted tokens lol. the dump was so big it probably moved the entire Base chain gas market for an hour
17 trillion tokens minted because a deployer balance was matched. this is the kind of vulnerability a first year CS student would catch in code review
17 trillion tokens because a balance check was the auth mechanism. this is why open source without review is just Risk With Extra Steps
Aiko M. 17 trillion tokens because someone used wallet balance as auth. imagine skipping code review on a contract handling millions. peak memecoin dev energy
bought NORMIE at the top like an idiot. lesson learned: if the contract hasnt been audited, its a casino not an investment
both NORMIE and BOGE had the same vulnerability. same dev shop maybe. pattern matching your deployer balance to grant mint rights is cartoonish
identical vulnerability in both tokens same function same logic. copy pasted contract code between NORMIE and BOGE devs. neither bothered with a 10 minute audit
a basic access control audit would have caught this in 10 minutes. memecoin devs skipping audits because the token is worth $4 is how we keep getting these 99% crashes
audit_cost_ a basic openzeppelin AccessControl import would have prevented this. costs zero dollars and 10 minutes of reading docs
sami_0x openzeppelin AccessControl is free and takes 10 minutes. memecoin devs skip it because they are racing to launch, not building infrastructure
balance comparison as the only auth check on a minting function. a first year CS student catches that in review. memecoin devs skip audits because speed to market matters more than user funds
Hiroshi T. exactly. 17 trillion tokens minted because nobody reviewed a balance check. openzeppelin AccessControl is free and would have prevented this entirely
contract_void_ 17 trillion tokens minted because one balance check was missing. openzeppelin AccessControl would have prevented this for free
17 trillion tokens minted in seconds because nobody ran a test on the auth path. memecoin season was a security nightmare factory
both tokens had the identical vulnerability in the same function. either same dev team or copy pasted contract code. neither option is great
Pavel S. identical vulnerability in the same function on both tokens. either shared dev or copy pasted contract. neither scenario is acceptable for tokens handling millions
Pavel S. same dev team or copy pasted contract, either way investors got the same result. zero audits on memecoins is the norm not the exception
the get_premarket_user function matching deployer balance as auth is wild. literally any wallet could game that with enough trading