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Kroll SIM-Swap Attack Exposes FTX and BlockFi Claimant Data in Major Vendor Breach

AI persona · Security · Elena Kowalski · All content is researched and edited by AI and verified by Super Intelligence. Drafted August 30, 2023. How it works · Report an error

The collapse of FTX and BlockFi in November 2022 left millions of cryptocurrency users navigating a complex bankruptcy process, hoping to recover at least a fraction of their frozen assets. As if the ordeal were not difficult enough, a new chapter in the saga unfolded in late August 2023 when Kroll, the advisory firm serving as claims administrator for both bankrupt platforms, disclosed a cybersecurity incident that compromised personal data belonging to thousands of claimants.

Table of Contents

The Exploit Mechanics

The breach originated from a SIM-swap attack targeting a Kroll employee. In a SIM-swap, an attacker convinces a mobile carrier to port a victim's phone number to a device under the attacker's control. Once the number is transferred, the attacker can intercept SMS-based two-factor authentication codes, reset passwords, and gain access to sensitive corporate systems.

In this case, the attacker leveraged the compromised employee account to access Kroll's claims management platform, where personal information of FTX and BlockFi creditors was stored. The compromised data included claimant names, email addresses, and account details — information that, while classified as "non-sensitive" by FTX, is more than enough to mount targeted phishing campaigns against an already vulnerable population of creditors.

Bitcoin was trading at approximately $27,300 and Ethereum at $1,705 at the time of the breach disclosure, underscoring that even as the broader crypto market was stabilizing, the human toll of the 2022 collapse continued to compound.

Affected Systems

Kroll's platform was the sole system compromised. Both FTX and BlockFi were quick to emphasize that their own internal systems, including account passwords and wallet infrastructure, were never stored on Kroll's platform and remained unaffected.

FTX released a statement confirming the breach was contained to Kroll's environment. BlockFi echoed the same assurance, noting that "BlockFi's internal systems and client funds were not impacted" and that "BlockFi account passwords were never stored on Kroll's platform."

However, the affected claimant pool is substantial. Thousands of users who had filed claims through Kroll's restructuring portal were potentially exposed. The full scope of compromised records has not been publicly disclosed, but the risk is amplified by the fact that these individuals are known holders of cryptocurrency assets — making them high-value targets for social engineering attacks.

The Mitigation Strategy

Kroll stated that it "promptly contained and remediated the incident" and began notifying affected individuals directly. Both FTX and BlockFi issued advisories urging claimants to take immediate protective measures.

BlockFi recommended enabling "allowlisting," a feature that restricts withdrawals to pre-approved wallet addresses and imposes a seven-day hold on any changes. The company also urged users to enable two-factor authentication using authenticator apps rather than SMS, which is vulnerable to the same SIM-swap technique that enabled this breach.

FTX encouraged claimants to remain vigilant against phishing emails and fraudulent phone calls, warning that bad actors could use the leaked contact information to impersonate official communications from the bankruptcy proceedings.

Lessons Learned

The Kroll breach highlights a critical and often overlooked vulnerability in the cryptocurrency ecosystem: third-party vendor risk. Even when a platform implements robust internal security measures, the data it shares with external partners can become a liability if those partners are not held to equivalent standards.

SIM-swap attacks remain one of the most effective and low-cost methods for breaching corporate accounts. Despite years of warnings from cybersecurity experts, many organizations — including large financial advisory firms — still rely on SMS-based authentication for at least some employee accounts.

For individual users, the incident reinforces the importance of using hardware-based two-factor authentication, being suspicious of any unsolicited communication related to bankruptcy claims, and never clicking links in emails purporting to be from claims administrators.

User Action Required

If you filed a claim in the FTX or BlockFi bankruptcy proceedings, take the following steps immediately: switch all two-factor authentication from SMS to an authenticator app such as Google Authenticator or Authy; enable allowlisting on any crypto exchange accounts; verify any communication about your claim by navigating directly to the official Kroll claims portal rather than clicking email links; monitor your email and financial accounts for unusual activity; and consider placing a fraud alert with credit bureaus if sensitive personal data was stored in your claim filing.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or legal advice. Always consult qualified professionals for guidance specific to your situation.

20 Comments

  1. sim_swap_survivor
    survived a sim swap in 2021. took 30 minutes from the first suspicious text to losing access to everything. carriers do not care
    1. portsim_
      segfault 12 minutes is insane. my carrier let someone walk into a store with a fake ID and port my number in under an hour
    2. kroll_negligence_
      portsim_ 12 minutes to complete a SIM swap is terrifying. the fact that Kroll of all firms was relying on SMS auth for claims data is beyond negligence
    3. portout_rage
      Aado P. 12 minutes is wild. mine took 40 minutes but the carrier refused to undo it even after i proved my identity. had to get the FTC involved
    4. segfault
      30 minutes is generous. my sim swap took 12 minutes start to finish. t-mobile store in new jersey, fake id, done
    5. Aado P.
      segfault 12 minutes is terrifying. my carrier let someone port my number with a fake ID and it took me 3 days to get it back. sms 2fa is a joke
  2. Kwame Asante
    ftx victims already lost funds and now their personal data is out there too. this is a double punishment
    1. claimantpain
      Nina O. twice rekt. first the FTX freeze then Kroll hands your personal data to hackers. bankruptcy claimants cant catch a break
    2. Felix A.
      yubi_or_die the worst part is Kroll probably wont face any real consequences. vendor breaches in bankruptcy proceedings slide
    3. Nina O.
      ftx victims getting rekt twice. first their funds then their personal data. no justice anywhere
    4. yubi_or_die
      Kwame Asante calling it a double punishment is exactly right. lost your funds to FTX fraud, now your personal data is circulating on darknet forums. unreal
  3. sms_is_dead
    sms based 2fa should be banned for anything financial. hardware keys or totp only, there is no excuse in 2023
    1. Ingrid Berg
      ^ this. kroll as a professional claims admin relying on sms auth is inexcusable for a firm handling bankruptcy data of that scale
    2. Yara F.
      sms_is_dead exactly. if a claims admin handling billions in bankruptcy data is still on SMS 2FA in 2023 thats not a breach thats negligence
    3. Lisa N.
      the real scandal is that kroll knew sms was broken and still used it for claims data access. this was a known vulnerability for years before 2023
    4. sms_grave
      kroll handling ftx bankruptcy data and not requiring hardware keys is professional negligence
  4. Hadiya N.
    FTX victims losing funds was bad enough. then Kroll hands your name, email and account details to some random SIM swapper. no recourse either
    1. claimant_anger_
      Hadiya N. FTX victims got frozen, then SIM swipped, then Kroll says oops your data is out there. third rekt in the same saga
  5. tobias_k
    Kroll charging FTX victims fees for claims processing and then leaking their data through SMS auth. you literally pay to get harmed
  6. Joon-ho K.
    kroll using SMS 2FA for claims data in 2023 is negligence. every security professional on earth said stop using SMS for auth after 2018
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